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1. Introduction 
What are the relations between ethical values and moral norms, on 
the one hand, and cognitive values and norms, on the other hand? Between 
ethical and intellectual virtues and vices? Between cognitive values and 
other types of value—aesthetic, hedonic, political, prudential and religious? 
Between kitsch, sham emotions or sentiments, and foolishness? Between 
foolishness and cognitive vices and forms of practical irrationality such as 
self-deception, ressentiment, blether, obscurantism, and obscurity? What 
are and should be our affective attitudes towards knowledge, truth, justifi-
cation, precision, and clarity? 
In 1930 Jose Ortega y Gasset wondered why there is still no study of 
foolishness (tonteria) dealing with those aspects of the phenomenon not 
investigated by Erasmus.1 The first installments of The Man Without Qual-
ities in 1931 and 1933 provide a remarkable panoply of fools, foolishness, 
silliness, and stupidity and a determined attempt to understand these phe-
nomena. The passion of the book is, its author says, the passion for precision.2 
Reason, he also says, "plays a great role" in his art.3 Many of the fools and 
follies in the novel are presented as examples of attempts to adapt mind 
(Geist) to life. The Parallel Action is, through and through, a foolish enter-
prise.4 Arnheim, Meingast, Feuermaul, Hans Sepp, Gerda, Diotima, 
Bonadea, Clarissa, and Professor Lindner display a variety of cognitive 
vices. Humanitarianism, intuition, mindless action or energy, and pharisaism 
are depicted as cognitive vices or evils. 
Ulrich and Agathe, on the other hand, are (imperfect) epistemic heroes. 
Agathe has "an unusually exact memory, which did not deform its con-
tents by any sort of prejudice or wishful thinking."5 But, we are told by 
the (Weiningerian?) narrator, although intelligent women such as Agathe 
are "unerring in their observation of the men they love," they have no the-
oretical inclinations.6 Unlike Ulrich, who is a prince of mind. Ulrich listens 
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to, analyses, evaluates, and indeed provokes an astonishing amount of 
nonsense and bullshit. Thus "Ulrich converses with Hans Sepp and Gerda 
in the pidgin-language of the frontier district between the super-rational 
and the sub-rational." What Sepp has to say is mere nonsense, claptrap 
(Geschwatz), peppered with pretentious nouns.7 
One early striking appearance of foolishness in the novel is the 
account given by Ulrich and the narrator of a peculiar phenomenon—the 
tendency of the cognitively virtuous to manifest this virtue or habit only 
in severely restricted contexts. Ulrich's second career, as an engineer, fills 
him with enthusiasm because of its possibilities: 
Who still needed the Apollo Belvedere when he had the new forms of a tur-
bodynamo . . . before his eyes ! . . . Looked at from a technical point of view, 
the world is simply ridiculous: impractical in all that concerns human rela-
tions, and extremely uneconomic and imprecise in its methods; anyone 
accustomed to solving his problems with a slide-rule cannot take seriously a 
good half of the assertions people make . . . If you own a slide-rule and 
someone comes along with big statements or great emotions, you say: "Just 
a moment, please—let's first work out the margin for error and the most 
probable values."8 
But "this powerful view of what it meant to be an engineer" is not shared 
by the engineers Ulrich has known, who fail to "adapt the daring and inno-
vative soul of [their] technology to [their] private soul[s]":9 
It is hard to say why engineers don't quite live up to this vision . . . [A]ny 
suggestion that they might apply their daring ideas to themselves instead of 
their machines would have taken them aback, much as if they had been asked 
to use a hammer for the unnatural purpose of killing a man.10 
Their cognitive virtues or habits, then, are manifested only selectively. 
The panoply of folly presented in the novel is contrasted in many 
ways with the first and third of the three individual Utopias explored one 
after the other in the novel—the Utopia of exactness and the Utopia of 
inductive humility. And these contrasts cannot be understood without 
understanding the relation between the two epistemic Utopias11 and the 
second Utopia, of the other condition (state). Musil's account of foolish-
ness is by no means restricted to his novel. It is everywhere in his essays, 
addresses, and other writings. In 1937 Musil published "On Stupidity" 
("Uber Dummheit"), which is based on a lecture given in the same year in 
Vienna. The number of his contemporaries writing and speaking for and 
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against Fascism, Bolshevism, and democracy is legion. Musil, however, 
turns his attention to foolishness.12 The publication of this essay in fact 
marks the end of a decade of intensive investigation of cognitive values 
and disvalues by a small but select group of thinkers. 
The decade begins with the publication in 1927 by Julien Benda of 
La Trahison des clercs (The Treason of the Clerisy), a treason due to the 
"desire to abase the values of knowledge before the values of action."13 It 
continues with the appearance in 1930 of Ortega's La Rebelion de las 
Masas (The Revolt of the Masses). It continues with publications by Ernst 
Robert Curtius, Nicolai Hartmann, Heinrich Gomperz, and Husserl's 
pleas for a "heroism of reason." The philosophical enemies of Husserl and 
Hartmann, the logical positivists and the logical empiricists, are also fas-
cinated by cognitive values. Throughout the decade Bertrand Russell and 
the only French member of the Vienna Circle, Louis Rougier, return again 
and again to a variety of cognitive vices. 
Musil's views about cognitive values are bound up with almost all 
his other views about how we do, could, might, would, or should live. 
Many of these views are couched in now unfamiliar terms. This is partic-
ularly true of his versions of such Austrian chestnuts as atheist or profane 
mysticism and the claim that the ethical is aesthetic. But it is also true of 
his meditations on the relations between possibilities, probabilities, and 
life and his account of ideals. Even those parts of his views which resem-
ble currently popular or familiar views, such as his distinction between 
ethics and morality and his ethical particularism and contextualism, have 
unfamiliar dimensions. In what follows I examine some of the main 
aspects and strata of Musil's account of foolishness. It will unfortunately 
not be possible to consider his explorations of the relations between fool-
ishness and, for example, panic, culture, enthusiasm (Schwdrmerei), 
vanity, amour propre, music, false feelings, hollow feelings, kitsch, senti-
mentality, intuitionism, literalism, and irony.14 
2. Pan-Romantic Follies 
One predecessor of the accounts and defenses of cognitive values 
published between 1927 and 1937 is the identification by Max Scheler of 
a misological German tendency he called Pan-Romanticism and his criti-
cisms of this movement. The principal Pan-Romantic is the German 
graphologist, ecologist, and philosopher, Ludwig Klages, one of the for-
gotten grandfathers of contemporary Continental Philosophy. The German 
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businessman and philosopher, Walther Rathenau, is also part of the ten-
dency, as is, for the most part, Oswald Spengler. Two other objects of 
Scheler's criticisms are the German pacifist, pedagogue, and progressive 
philosopher Wilhelm Forster and Expressionism. 
Musil, who notes very early that the philosophy of Rathenau belongs 
to a "neo-romantic" trend, criticizes in great detail the irrationalisms of 
Rathenau and Spengler. But his most striking anatomies of misology are 
his explorations of the minds and lives of Arnheim, Meingast, Feuermaul, 
and Prof. Lindner in his novel. The model for Arnheim is Rathenau; for 
Meingast, Klages; for Feuermaul, the Expressionist poet from Prague and 
kitsch counterpart of Rilke, Franz Werfel; for Prof. Lindner, Forster. 
Pan-Romanticism, a descendant not only of Romanticism but also of 
the philosophy of life of Nietzsche, opposes mind (Geist) to life, and sees 
the latter as a victim of the former. Mind, that is to say, the will and the intel-
lect, oppresses life, the soul and, in particular, the heart. Mind (Geist) and 
soul (Seek) are, then, very different things. Intellect, understanding, cal-
culation, and the will are bad. The soul, emotions, feelings, and intuitions are 
good. Pan-Romanticism is, Scheler thinks, a specifically German disease: 
This strange theory . . . turns out to be a strict logical consequence if one . . . 
distinguishes Geist, or reason, and life as two ultimate metaphysical agents, 
but identifies life with soul and Geist with technical intelligence and—and 
this is decisive—makes vital values into the highest values . . . Geist is then 
a demon, yes—the Devil, the power which destroys life and soul . . . Geist 
appears as a metaphysical parasite which bores into life and soul in order to 
destroy them.15 
Scheler quotes one of the leading pan-romantics, Theodor Lessing: 
.. . my basic thought.. . [is] that the world of Geist and its norm is no more 
than the indispensable Ersatz-world of life which has become sick because 
of man, merely the means of saving a species of predatory ape [Raubaffe] ... 
gone mad because of science.16 
Scheler and Musil reject both the evaluative claims behind this twentieth-
century Rousseauism and also the conception of mind it employs. It is a 
widespread theoretical mistake, they think, to exclude affectivity from the 
mind. And it is a normative mistake to place the value of life higher than 
that of Geist. (Their versions of these mistakes are not, of course, identi-
cal.) They are also both very critical of the intuitionisms and irrationalisms 
which these mistakes encourage. Indeed they say that they are involved in 
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a struggle against the revivals of Romanticism.17 Musil's interrogations of 
these revivals and related doctrines take very seriously a question asked 
by Nietzsche and William James: what happens when people live accord-
ing to a philosophy? 
Consider, for example, Arnheim, a "man of reality" (Wirklichkeit).1* 
Whereas Ulrich is a "prince of Geist," Arnheim 
is not a prince of Geist, but a great man of letters . . . The great man of letters 
has replaced the prince of Geist... He is a particular form of the connection 
between Geist and great things.19 
And "there is nothing so dangerous for Geist as its involvement with great 
things."20 Arnheim thinks of Ulrich as a "brilliant" (geistvollen) man who 
is unable to 
recognize the advantages life offers and to adjust his Geist to the great 
objects and opportunities that would bring him status and a solid footing in 
life. Ulrich manifested the absurd contrary conviction that life had to adapt 
to Geist.21 
One way in which Geist adapts itself to life is through the cognitive 
vice of self-deception. Arnheim's confrontation with Ulrich leads him into 
self-deception: 
Arnheim took it for granted that he could find a way to neutralize his oppo-
nent. But he wanted to win Ulrich over, to influence him, teach him, compel 
his admiration. In order to make this easier, he had talked himself into feeling 
a deep and paradoxical affection for Ulrich, though he would not have 
known how to account for this.22 
Arnheim's self-deception involves a fake feeling, a make-believe senti-
ment, what Stendhal calls an "amour de tete" Its starting point is not just "the 
decision to get Ulrich into his power" but a failure to admit something: 
Ulrich, in his antagonism, had at last succeeded in touching Arnheim to 
the quick . . . [Arnheim] admitted to himself that nothing of this sort had hap-
pened to him for a long time. The usual methods by which he achieved 
success were of no avail here. For the effect a great and integral man has is 
like the effect of beauty: it can no more stand up to a denial of its existence 
than a balloon can stand up to having holes drilled into it . . . Not that 
Arnheim confessed as much to himself in these words, but he did think . . . 
—a superb example of what pass for thoughts in an enemy of Geist— 
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"I cannot endure contradiction, because it is only the intellect [Verstand] that 
thrives on contradiction, and I despise anyone who possesses only intellect!"23 
Arnheim's self-deceptions are by no means limited to his relations to Ulrich. 
His attachment to soul is such that, like Rathenau, he uses the word 
"Seele" in his writings "like a method, a flying start, as a sovereign term": 
But what was questionable and uncertain was whether Arnheim, when he 
spoke of the soul, himself believed in it and ascribed to the possession of a 
soul the same reality as to his own possession of stocks and shares. He used 
it as a term for something for which he had no other term.24 
The inseparability of form and content is not merely a mark of successful 
verbal art. It may also be a symptom of language on holiday, of philo-
sophical nonsense, as in the case of "Seele" and its meaning for Rathenau/ 
Arnheim. Such nonsense is at the heart of Rathenau's central self-deception. 
Arnheim's Geist is all humbug: 
There was a con game [Schwindel] in this union between the soul and the 
price of coal, a union that at the same time purposefully served to keep apart 
what Arnheim did with his eyes open and what he said and wrote in a cloud 
of intuition.25 
Arnheim's self-deceptions are the result of adapting Geist to life. 
They are made up of make-believe sentiments and make-believe beliefs 
which function in his life like sentiments and beliefs. Franz Blei,26 a friend 
to Musil, Scheler, and Rathenau, quotes (incorrectly) as the most striking 
(das Treffendste) thing Musil says about Rathenau the following passage 
about Arnheim: 
And it is equally certain that his ambition to master all there was to be known 
. . . found in the soul a means of devaluing everything that his intellect could 
not master. For in this he was not different from his whole era, which had 
newly developed a strong religious tendency, not as the result of any reli-
gious destiny [Bestimmung, vocation] but merely, as it seems, out of a 
feminine and irritable rebellion against money, knowledge, and calculation, 
to all of which it passionately succumbed.27 
The mechanism Musil describes here is that of ressentiment or sour 
grapes—"devaluing" (entwerten) something in order to make life more 
agreeable. Arnheim's self-deceptions and his ressentiment are two of the 
most fundamental features of his irrationality. 
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We have seen that Arnheim thinks Ulrich is unable to recognize the 
advantages life offers and to adjust his Geist to the great objects and 
opportunities that would bring him a solid footing in life. This failure is "part 
of what Arnheim means" by what he calls Ulrich's wit (Witz).28 "All his life, 
Arnheim had felt an almost morbidly sensitive dislike of wit and irony."29 
Arnheim's self-deceptions and his dislike of wit and irony are two of the 
components of the deep existential envy or jealousy Ulrich provokes in 
Arnheim.30 Irony is, of course, the appropriate reaction to foolishness.31 
Arnheim is one among many to whom Ulrich's strictures, formulated 
just before he puts forward his "preposterous" proposal to found a World 
Secretariat for Precision and Soul, apply: 
. . . those who feel called upon to act, in order to restore some meaning to 
life, have one thing in common: they despise 'mere' thinking just at the point 
where it could lead us to truths rather than simple personal opinions; instead, 
where everything depends on pursuing those views to their inexhaustible 
wellspring, they opt for shortcuts and half-truths.32 
The analysis of the follies of Arnheim (and other characters) and 
their relation to Pan-Romanticism are, as we shall now see, merely the 
surface of the anatomy of foolishness in Musil's novel. 
3. Normative Minimalism and the Rejection of Ideals 
Two of the most important parts of Musil's reflections about norma-
tive matters are his use of a distinction between ethics and morality and 
his criticisms of ideals. (Others are his contextualism, his particularism, 
his distinctions between what is good tout court, good-good and good-bad 
as well as his philosophy of possibility and probability.) They are both 
intimately bound up with his understanding of foolishness. Like such 
recent philosophers as Bernard Williams and earlier philosophers such as 
Nietzsche, Meinong, and Scheler, Musil distinguishes sharply between 
ethics and morality. In 1922 he traces "a boundary between ethics and 
morality" as follows: 
In accordance with its prescriptive nature, morality is tied to experiences 
that can be replicated, and these are precisely what characterize rationality as 
well, for a concept can only take hold in areas where explicitness and, figu-
ratively speaking, replicability obtain. Thus there exists a profound connection 
between the civilizing character of morality and of the scientific spirit, whereas 
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the truly ethical experience, such as love, searching one's heart, or humility, 
is, even where it is of a social nature, something difficult to transmit, some-
thing quite personal and almost anti - social... What passes for ethics in our 
current literature is for the most part a narrow foundation of real ethics, with 
a skyscraper of morality above it.33 
In 1913 Musil had summed up the categorical imperative in an essay 
which distinguishes between two types of morality rather than ethics and 
morality: 
The categorical imperative, and what has counted since as specifically moral 
experience, is at bottom nothing but a grumpily dignified scheme [eine bar-
beissig wurdige Intrige] to return once again to feeling. But this forces into 
the foreground something entirely secondary and dependent, which assumes 
moral laws instead of creating them; an auxiliary experience of morality, and 
by no means its central experience.34 
In a note on the morality of Anders, Ulrich's predecessor, Musil writes: 
Act in such a way that your acting can be a recipe [Rezept] for everyone— 
this Kantian morality is the German morality, is conscientiousness personified. 
And opposes to it Anders's view: 
Do not act so that your acting is a recipe for everyone, but so that it is valu-
able. Where "value" comes from the sphere of the other state, is that indefinable 
"living" movement.35 
In 1914 he says that in the other condition there "is no ethical [ethisches] 
action but only an ethical state, within which an immoral [unsittliches] 
activity or way of being is impossible."36 Thus Musil distinguishes 
between ethical values and moral rules or laws, but also between moral-
ity which reflects or derives from ethical values and morality which does 
not have this feature. Ethical value or '"value"' is associated above all 
with the other condition, the different states of felicity or beatitude 
[Seligkeit]—erotic, aesthetic, and mystical.37 
These distinctions and claims are the background to the plea for what 
might be called moral minimalism: 
It would be a useful experiment to try to cut down to the minimum the moral 
expenditure (of whatever kind) that accompanies all our actions, to satisfy 
ourselves with being moral only in those exceptional cases where it really 
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counts, but otherwise not to think differently from the way we do about stan-
dardizing pencils or screws.38 
In a world where morality is minimal "the washed-out prints that develop 
from the pallid resemblance of actions to virtues would disappear from the 
image of life."39 Moral minimalism may be justified in many different 
ways. On some views of virtue a morally virtuous person typically mani-
fests his virtues automatically. Similarly, one might think that political 
conservatism—as opposed to conservatism tout court—requires moral 
minimalism. Moral minimalism also recommends itself for the same sort 
of aesthetic reasons that all forms of minimalism recommended them-
selves to so many modernist Austrians—clean lines and the elimination of 
ornamentation are as important in life as in architecture. But Musil pre-
sents moral minimalism as a way of living "with precision."40 What does 
this mean? His justification of moral and, more generally, normative min-
imalism differs from those mentioned (without being incompatible with 
them). It is to be found in his critique of ideals. 
In his 1921 essay "The Nation as Ideal and as Reality," Musil says of 
the way of thinking which takes seriously the ideal of the nation, particu-
larly when the nation is conceived of in racial and collectivist terms, that 
it "produces the person who has fixed recipes and sublimely simple rules 
for everything, who puts himself above spiritual experience: the Phar-
isee."41 The moral pharisee continually asks himself what his moral duty 
requires. The pharisee described by Musil, for whom the nation is an 
ideal, considers everything from the point of view of the realization or 
nonrealization of his ideal. The results, Musil thinks, are a series of cog-
nitive vices, failures, and bad habits: "a diseased way of thinking"; 
"truthfulness and intellectual refinement become dulled"; "all the germ 
cells of morality degenerate": 
When virtue is declared to be national property by predestination, the Lord's 
vineyard is expropriated and no one needs to work in it any more. The indi-
vidual is flattered into believing that he possesses everything desirable by 
merely contemplating the virtues of his "race."42 
Musil describes a "lack of respect for the mind (Geist) in the name of the 
German Spirit (Geist)": 
Broad circles of our people—and one is almost inclined to say the ones with 
the best intentions—have lost the ability to judge an achievement by its sub-
stance; they test it only according to its origins, and thereafter as it fits into their 
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system of prejudices. The broadest is measured by the narrowest, the versa-
tile mind by one of its stillbirths. Attention has turned away from values to their 
accompanying circumstances, from reality to hypothesis, and those who are 
called upon to follow have been seized by a sectarian arrogance and preaching.43 
The ethico-political ideal of the nation engenders and is the result of 
cognitive vices. Musil's target however is not only the ideal of the nation 
but the ideal of the nation. His view is that the ideal of the nation is a bad 
thing because ideals are bad things: "ideals are the worst enemies of ide-
alism. Ideals are dead idealism, decaying remains [Verwesungsriickstdnde]" 
says Thomas in Die Schwdrmer.44 Indeed "[i]deals and morality are the 
best means for filling that big hole called soul."45 
Musil's criticisms of ideals resemble those of Nietzsche and, for 
example, Ibsen and Shaw.46 Views of this kind are by no means common 
within contemporary normative philosophy, although they are to be found 
wherever Nietzsche and Spinoza are taken seriously. The rejection of 
ideals as pharisaical amounts to the claim that the most popular kinds of 
normative ethics are pharisaical. In order to see what is involved here we 
should distinguish different claims about pharisaism. There are different 
kinds of pharisaism corresponding to the different families of normative 
concepts. There is the pharisaism of ethical goodness where the ideal is to 
be ethically good (the "Unco Guid" of Robert Burns's poem, "Holy Willie's 
Prayer"). There is deontic pharisaism—the ideal is my moral duty. There 
is aretaic pharisaism, the pharisaism of virtue and, finally, the pharisaism 
of moral and political right and wrong—righteousness or political cor-
rectness. In each case pharisaism requires a first-person perspective: I am 
concerned with my ethical or moral value, duty, virtue, etc. And of course, 
the first-person perspective may be a plural egotistical perspective. With 
respect to each form of pharisaism we may distinguish a strong (Max 
Scheler) and a weak claim (Nicolai Hartmann). The strong claim is that it 
is always ethically a bad thing to take one's relation to such ideals seri-
ously—for example, to ask oneself what one's moral duty requires. The 
weak claim is that doing this too often is a bad thing. Another weakening 
of the strong claim restricts the epithet of pharisiaism to, say, deontic 
moral ideals. Musil's reflections about ideals are not sufficiently detailed 
for it to be possible to pin him down about pharisaism. But there can be 
little doubt of the importance he attached to identifying and criticizing the 
reliance on ideals. His explanation of the outbreak of the Great War, like 
that given by Shaw, refers to ideals.47 
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The category of ideals is closely linked to two other frequent targets 
of Musil's irony and satire: great things and Seinesgleichen geschieht 
("Pseudoreality prevails," "The like of it happens"). We have already 
noted the importance of great things for a very intelligent fool such as 
Arnheim. One of Musil's most nastily accurate remarks about the "great" 
man of letters, Thomas Mann, is that he turns all his experiences into cat-
egorical imperatives. Amongst the many things one does because "one" 
does them is to behave in such a way that one realizes and fails to realize 
ideals which continually hover before one's mind: 
But the minute a soul has morals,... ideals in the spheres of duty and beauty, 
it has been equipped with a system of rules . . . that it must obey before it can 
think of being a respectable soul.48 
What is Musil's alternative to the ideals one looks up to and occasionally 
lives up to, to the method "which admittedly kills the soul but then, so to 
speak, preserves it for general consumption by canning it in small quanti-
ties"? The method is adopted out of fear. One "takes refuge from the 
impossibility of living constantly in [a] fire by beginning to live for the 
fire . . . ."49 Musil contrasts living for an ideal and living in something: 
". . . a great difference: to live for something or to live in something!"50 
for example, living for religion and living in a religious state, living reli-
giously.51 Living In is life in the other condition or life which approximates 
to it or takes it seriously. The idea of living In is closely related to what 
Musil also calls living essentially and a motivated life. The already men-
tioned "hole," which is brimming over with ideals, prevents any sort of 
life In: 
I attempt to show what I call the "hole in European morality," .. . because it 
prevents right action: it is, in brief, the false treatment which has been 
accorded to mystical experience.52 
Lindner, Schmeisser, and Meingast are "For-Men" (Fur-Manner) as 
is Hagauer.53 Nor are they the only such men in the novel. But Musil's 
most vivid account of what it is to live for an ideal is his portrait of Prof. 
Lindner, the "Tugut" or do-gooder.54 Already in 1914 Musil notes that the 
idea that "good works in this world somehow constitute our existence in 
the next" has become a favorite idea of spiritualist philosophy.55 Do-
gooders, where the relevant type of goodness is ethical goodness, what is 
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often (although not by Musil) opposed to evil, are deontic Pharisees: 
"Lindner transformed absolutely everything he came into contact with 
into a moral imperative . . ,"56 just like (Musil's) Thomas Mann, and all 
those who "turn a condition into an imperative, a state of grace into a 
norm, a state of being into a purpose."57 Lindner lives as "one" lives and 
is supposed to live: his remarkable inclination to subject himself to a daily 
"regime" "is a result of the movement toward the worker-warrior-anthill 
state toward which the world is moving."58 His mental life is dominated 
by ideals: ". . . there hovered before him as an ideal for the world a com-
munity of fully responsible moral personalities . . . ,"59 He is one of the 
right-minded {Gutgesinnten) of those who "descend from the unimportant 
to the trivial without noticing a difference"60—not by any means an 
ethical vice. He is, Musil writes in his notes, an "example of a man who 
lives For and is afraid of living In."61 
Living In stands to living For as being good to doing good. Ulrich seems 
to accept that "the good will is not to will the good but to will in goodness."62 
Agathe applies the lessons she has learned from Ulrich to Hagauer: 
Well, perhaps it was rather that [Hagauer] was one of those people who 
always do the good thing; they themselves have no goodness in them, Agathe 
thought. It seems that goodness disappears from the human being to the same 
extent that it is embodied in goodwill or good deeds!63 
Living for an ideal is an ethical error. To live for an ideal is to be 
blinded by fear. As we have seen, Lindner is "afraid" of living In, one 
"takes refuge from" the impossibility of living constantly in by beginning 
to live for. More generally, living for is a pretext which is advantageous. 
He who adopts ideals 
fills the many moments of his day . . . not with his ideal state but with the 
many ways of achieving it by overcoming obstacles and incidents—which 
guarantees that he will never need to attain it.64 
But to live for ideals is also to be guilty of "rationalization" where this 
"new word" signifies self-deception, for one's beliefs to be bound up with 
the convictions one would like to have. "The fact is that people prefer 
wanting to be good, beautiful and sincere to being good, beautiful and 
sincere."65 Such pharisaism is foolish and makes its sanctimonious victim 
more and more foolish: "that for which a person lives is a magnet, which 
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grows larger and larger through that which it attracts.66 To the extent that 
normative ideals regularly hover before a person's mind these make him 
blind to the way the world really is. One who, faced with a drowning child, 
asks himself what his moral duty requires is blind to what is going on. 
4. Foolishness, Stupidity, and Interest 
Musil's 1937 address "Tiber Dummheit," which draws extensively 
on his novel, is his most direct and extended attempt to understand what 
he calls stupidity. He reflects on the use of "dumm" and related words. 
Like Wittgenstein and Biihler, and influenced by Klages's account of 
"Liebe," he thinks that some words are what have been called family 
resemblance terms.67 He also distinguishes two "very different" kinds of 
what he calls "Dummheit." The first kind is honest and straightforward— 
based on "weakness of understanding," it is "a little dull of comprehension" 
and has a '"dim wit'." It is "poor in ideas and words, and awkward in 
applying them;" it is slow. It is, we might say, whatever is measured by IQ 
tests. In the second kind, even "an undamaged innate intelligence" may be 
hindered, frustrated, and led astray by the most varied kinds of mental 
(geistige) and psychological (seelische) deviations. Musil does not think 
that the second kind of Dummheit is compatible with a lack of intelli-
gence: "somewhat paradoxically, it is even a sign of intelligence." Unlike 
the first kind it is based "more on an understanding that is weak only with 
regard to some particular." Musil says that German has only one word for 
these two phenomena—"Dummheit."68 The distinction between the two 
might be marked in English by distinguishing between stupidity, under-
stood as the absence of intelligence, something one is born with, which 
endures, and foolishness (Torheit, sottise), a vice or bad habit, which 
either endures or occurs. 
Of the "higher, pretentious form of stupidity" Musil says that it 
is not so much lack of intelligence as failure of intelligence for the reason 
that it presumes to accomplishments to which it has no right; and it can have 
all the bad characteristics of weakness of understanding, and in addition all 
those characteristics brought about by every heart [Gemiit] that is not in 
balance, that is misshapen and erratically active; in short, every heart that 
deviates from health. To put it more accurately: because there are no 'nor-
malized' hearts, this deviation expresses an insufficient play of harmony 
between the one-sidedness of feeling and an understanding that is not strong 
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enough to hold it in check. This higher stupidity is the real disease of culture 
[Bildungskrankheii]... and to describe it is an almost infinite task. It reaches 
into the highest intellectual sphere [Geistigkeii] . . . Years ago I wrote about 
this form of stupidity that "there is absolutely no significant idea that stupid-
ity would not know how to apply; stupidity is active in every direction, and 
can dress up in all the clothes of truth. Truth, on the other hand, has for every 
occasion only one dress and one path, and is always at a disadvantage." The 
stupidity this addresses is no mental illness [Geisteskrankheit], yet it is most 
lethal [lebensgefahrlichste], the disease of Geist that endangers life itself.69 
The example of Arnheim shows just how the higher form of stupid-
ity can take on characteristics which are due to an erratically active heart. 
Musil's anatomy of its variety focuses on novel species of foolishness, 
those encouraged by neo-romantic philosophies which proclaim that mind 
is the enemy of life. According to Musil, foolish minds endanger life 
itself. Musil gives part of the explanation for the variety of foolishness, 
the fact that there is no significant idea to which foolishness cannot apply 
although foolishness itself is always camouflaged: "If it were not so hard 
to distinguish stupidity from talent, progress, hope, or improvement, no 
one would want to be stupid."70 As Aquinas says, "though no man wishes 
to be a fool, yet he wishes those things of which folly is a consequence." 
What does Musil oppose to the second "intelligent" kind of stupid-
ity? One answer, as we shall see, is: the significant, the valuable. In order 
to understand this curious formulation it is useful to consider the follow-
ing objection to Musil. If ideals are a bad thing, are not cognitive ideals 
also a bad thing? At the end of a draft for a 1935 lecture in Paris, Musil 
mentions conditions for the rise of culture such as 
freedom, openness, courage, incorruptibility, responsibility, and criticism, crit-
icism even more against what seduces us than against what repels us. These 
concepts must even include the love of truth . . . because what we call culture 
is not directly subservient to the criterion of truth; but no great culture can 
rely on a distorted relationship to truth.71 
But, so the objection, if ethical ideals are a bad thing, are not ideals such 
as truth also a bad thing? Musil's alternative to the pharisaical prolifera-
tion of normative ideals which hover before the mind and fill up the soul 
is, as we have seen, a minimal morality which is anchored in the value of 
things like the other condition. What, then, stands to cognitive virtue or 
good cognitive habits as the other condition stands to morality? The answer 
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suggested by Musil's novel is: interest and attention. Ulrich and the nar-
rator of the novel display at all times an extraordinary degree, depth, urgency, 
and variety of interest and attention. Their interest and attention are directed 
towards a large variety of normative matters. Such interest and attention lie 
behind their will to know and to find out. Ulrich points out that, although 
many feelings are an obstacle to knowing, one group of feelings makes 
knowledge possible: 
But knowing . . . possesses a specific peculiarity in relation to the emotions 
that is easily perceived and characterized: in order to know we must put aside 
our emotions to the greatest extent possible. We block them out in order to 
be "objective," or we place ourselves in a state in which the abiding emotions 
neutralize each other, or we abandon ourselves to a group of cool feelings 
that, handled carefully, are themselves conducive to knowledge. We draw 
upon what we apprehend in this clear-headed condition for comparison when 
in other cases we speak of "delusions" through the emotions; and then we 
have a zero condition, a neutralized state: in short a specific state of the emo-
tions, the silent presupposition of experience and thought processes with 
whose aid we consider as merely subjective whatever other emotional states 
used to delude us . . . So our emotional attitude too, if it is to be adapted to 
reality, does not depend solely on the emotions governing us at the moment 
. . . but depends simultaneously on the enduring and recurrent emotional 
state that guarantees an understanding of reality and is usually as little 
visible as the air within which we breathe.12 
Ulrich does not say what the relevant cool feelings are. A very good can-
didate is interest. (Another is attention. Musil's Doktorvater, Carl Stumpf, 
thought that attention was just interest.) Interest, like the other cognitive 
feelings, such as wonder, astonishment, and surprise, and like attention, 
has no opposite. This is not because it is a neutral feeling, as is surprise. Inter-
est is a positive feeling. But it is a cool feeling because it has no opposite. 
It is also a feeling which can endure. 
What triggers interest and attention? Often, novelty. But interest is 
also triggered by what seems to be intrinsically valuable for someone, for 
example, what he really is and may become, his vocation, his interests.73 
What seems to be valuable in this way triggers attention and interest— 
other things being equal. Of course, things are often not equal. Often 
enough, knowledge or the prospect of discovery is painful or disagreeable. 
The prospect of painful knowledge leads, as we have seen, to self-decep-
tion and ressentiment. And as any reader of The Man Without Qualities 
FOOLISHNESS, STUPIDITY, AND COGNITIVE VALUES 81 
knows, although interest and attention may lead to the desire or will to 
know, they are not necessary.74 
As already mentioned, Musil opposes intelligent stupidity, what I 
have called foolishness, to the significant: 
The significant (important) unites the truth we are able to perceive in it with 
qualities of the feelings that give us confidence for something new: for an 
insight but also a resolve, for fresh perseverance, for whatever has both intel-
lectual and emotional content and "suggests" ["zumutet"] a certain kind of 
conduct in ourselves or in others; this is the way it could be put; and what is 
more important in connection with stupidity is that the significant is accessi-
ble to criticism's understanding aspect as well as to its feeling aspect. The 
significant is also the common opposite of both stupidity and coarseness 
(brutality), and the general disproportion in which, today, emotions crush 
reason instead of inspiring it also merges with the notion of the significant.75 
The significant here is perhaps just the valuable. In the writings of both 
the phenomenologists and the Gestalt psychologists value is said to 
require or motivate or demand (fordern) reactions of different types. 
Musil says that the significant "suggests" kinds of conduct. Musil's view 
seems to be that awareness of (apparent) value is opposed to stupidity of 
the higher kind because such awareness typically triggers interest and so 
epistemic desires.76 
What, if anything, works against foolishness? Musil's answer is that 
"the . . . most important weapon against stupidity [is]: modesty [Beschei-
dung]."11 His elaboration of this claim is to be found in his (incomplete) 
account of the Utopia of inductive humility. 
Wisdom, it is often asserted, is the or an opposite of foolishness. 
Musil concludes "On Stupidity" as follows: 
. . . I declare myself in no position to go further; for one step beyond the point 
at which we are stopping and we would leave the realm of stupidity which 
even theoretically has an extraordinary variety, and would arrive in the realm 
of wisdom, a desolate [ode] region that is generally shunned.78 
Should wisdom be shunned in a philosophy of foolishness? If foolishness is 
indifference or hostility towards cognitive values, then Pan-Romantics and 
Postmodernists preach foolishness and, if they are not hypocrites, are fools. 
Is, then, wisdom a function of a due appreciation of such values? The affir-
mative answer to this question turns cognitive values into ideals, a way of 
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speaking sometimes endorsed by Musil, as we have seen. There is an 
alternative answer which avoids treating cognitive values as ideals: wisdom 
is just the absence of foolishness. This view resembles such normative claims 
as: injustice is the absence of justice, health is the absence of illness, gram-
maticality is the absence of ungrammaticality; and also such nonnormative 
claims as that reality is the absence of illusion. Of the two, foolishness and 
wisdom, it is the former which wears the trousers.79 
Musil's explorations of foolishness are part of the fabric of his novel, 
part of its "immanent philosophy"—a term he employs when comparing 
Beyle and Bronte (Charlotte).80 Just how they function aesthetically is a 
question not even touched upon here. His explorations are part of his struggle 
against foolishness and of his effort to say something new about it: "Where 
art has value it shows things that few have seen."81 One type of knowl-
edge fiction may provide is of the noncontingent connections between values 
of different types and what makes their bearers valuable, their "valifiers."82 
Great works of fiction, it seems to me, point to new value-makers for old 
values more often than to the new values Nietzsche and his followers 
dream of. Musil extends our knowledge of what sorts of thing may make 
someone exemplify the cognitive disvalue of foolishness in ways that go 
well beyond Flaubert's pioneering efforts in the same direction.83 
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46. Shaw's (1960 [1891]) The Quintessence of Ibsenism anticipates in remarkable 
detail Musil's critique of ideals. 
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48. Musil 1995, 198. 
49. Musil 1995,1, 198-99, first emphasis mine—KM. 
50. Musil 1978, GW 5, 1635. 
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68. Musil 1990, 282. 
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tinction between the two types of stupidity cf. Musil (1995, I, 37; Musil 1978, GW 8, 
1221). 
70. Musil 1990, 268. 
71. Musil 1990,267. 
72. Musil 1995, II, 1299-300, translation modified, emphases mine—KM. 
73. Cf. Mulligan (2009). 
74. Cf. Musil (1995,1, ch 72). 
75. Musil 1990, 286, translation modified. 
76. Cf. Mulligan (2009a). In 1913 Musil put forward the very interesting suggestion 
that ethical goodness and evil, like beauty and ugliness, are not opposites (Musil 1990, 38). 
Did he perhaps give up his earlier view? 
77. Musil 1990,286. 
78. Musil 1990,286. 
79. As they stand, such formulations are clearly inadequate. First, tables are neither ill 
(foolish) nor healthy (wise). Perhaps, then, we should say that to be healthy is to be not ill 
and the sort of thing which in virtue of its nature can be ill. Second, claims to the effect 
that of two axiological terms one wears the trousers should come with some account of 
axiological indifference. 
80. Musil 1983, 316. On Stendhal and Musil, cf. Lombardo (2009). 
81. Musil 1990,7. 
82. The claim that fiction is a source of knowledge about contingent facts about human 
psychology has become very unpopular due to empirical work sceptical of the reality of 
character. Musil anticipated very thoroughly such scepticism about character, although 
unlike many psychologists he is less sceptical about enduring attachments and sentiments. 
83. Cf. Vatan (2009). 
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